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Abstract
With the ongoing liberalization and integration of European energy markets and the increasing
worries about security of supply, the need for thorough economic analysis of electricity markets
is growing. We develop a model for the European electricity market, taking into account
imperfect competition through conjectural variations, as well as imperfect international
competition due to import capacity restrictions. The model distinguishes between competition
on the output market and competition in capacity investments. We ﬁnd that the least competitive
of these determines wholesale prices.1 Introduction
The integration and liberalization of European electricity markets brought about a great number
of changes to the sector. Coming from a heavily regulated situation of government owned
regional and national monopolies, electricity producers will now have to compete for market
shares and proﬁts. This new situation brings about a lot of uncertainty, both for producers and
for regulators and policy makers.
At the same time, recent outages in the US and several European countries have fuelled fears
about security of supply. Will liberalized electricity markets provide sufﬁcient supply security
for a good as vital as electricity? Will the damage caused by business cycles be limited to price
spikes or will we experience frequent black-outs in the near future? What role should the
government play in securing supply in a liberalized market? The challenge lies in reaping the
beneﬁts of competition without having to suffer from severe side-effects.
These recent changes in the structure of the electricity market have induced a sprawl of
economic research, with a wide range of differing model applications. Green and Newberry
(1992) develop a supply function equilibrium model of the British spot market, whereas Boom
(2003) focuses on capacity investment in Germany. Von der Fehr and Harbord (1997) develop a
game-theoretical model of capacity investment, focussing on decentralized markets. A recent
overview of other electricity market models, focussing on the bidding process, may be found in
David and Wen (2000).
The model discussed in this paper describes both competition in output and capacity
investment decisions. As in real life, decisions regarding output and capacity are interrelated in
the model. Using a conjectural variations approach, we allow for differences between long term
and short term competitiveness of the market. Furthermore, cross border restrictions are
explicitly modelled, to take into account their impact on competition between producers from
neighbouring countries.
The purpose of the model is to predict investment levels and electricity prices in the
liberalized electricity market. The model may be used to look into issues related to security of
supply, as well as questions regarding institutional design. Policy measures in both ﬁelds may be
added to the model to assess their effects on scarcity and prices.
This Memorandum is written for policy makers and researchers who are interested in
electricity markets, as well as for those interested in building electricity market models.
Technical details for the latter are included in appendices. The remainder of this paper is
organized as follows. Chapter 2 brieﬂy describes the electricity market and the issues currentlyunder attention. In chapter 3, we discuss how our model deals with the market structure of the
electricity market, followed by a formal description of the model itself. Data and calibration are
discussion in chapter 5, followed by a numerical example to illustrate the model in chapter 6.
The appendices contain the technical details of the model.
The authors thank Rob Aalbers (OCFEB) and Machiel Mulder (CPB), who advanced our
understanding of modelling the electricity market. Rob drew our attention to Borenstein et al.
(2000) (see appendix A) and to the possible substitution of electricity consumption over time
(see note 9). We also like to thank Bert Smid (CPB) for valuable comments to an earlier version
of this Memorandum. All remaining errors are ours.
22 The electricity market
2.1 Introduction
This chapter gives a broad overview of the electricity market, its institutional setting and some of
the current issues of interest. Section 2.2 describes the product characteristics of electricity,
followed by a brief description of market segments and players. We discuss the types of markets
electricity is traded on in section 2.4. The following two sections of this chapter discuss the
liberalization and integration of European electricity markets and the issue of supply security.
We conclude by brieﬂy summarizing the role of electricity market characteristics in our model.
2.2 Product characteristics
We start this chapter by describing several product characteristics of electricity. These product
characteristics are essential for understanding the economics of electricity markets. First of all,
electricity can not be stored. In discussions with electricity specialists, it is often heard that
electricity is a unique product because of this characteristic. We would like to stress however
that it shares this unique characteristic with virtually all services. It is impossible to stockpile
taxi rides or to build up a collection of medical services. Likewise, one cannot purchase a ballet
performance and store it for later use. All these products and many more are, like electricity,
consumed at the same time they are produced.
Another important characteristic of electricity is that the demand for electricity is often
derived demand. We do not need electricity for its own merits, rather we need it to facilitate
consumption of other goods, leisure or productive activities. If for instance, one would like to
consume a television programme, electricity is needed to do so. Therefore, the demand for
electricity follows from demand for other goods and services, as well as from decisions on how
time is divided between leisure and work. This implies that the consumption of electricity is
related to our daily patterns, which is also mentioned regularly as one of the unique
characteristics of electricity. Again, this characteristic is not as unique as it may seem.
Transportation is another clear example of a good with a recognizable time-of-use pattern.
A third characteristic that is of interest is that energy is transported through networks. These
networks have the special feature that only the net ﬂow of electricity from A to B has to be
transported physically. This is relevant for the maximum capacity of a connection between two
between regions. Also, the electricity ﬂows autonomously, ruled by the laws of physics. More or
less like water pumped through a water supply system. The economic implication is that this
feature complicates the possibility to exclude users from consumption, although this is still
3possible by making technical adjustments at the exit(s) of the network.
2.3 Market segments and players
The provision of electricity to end users takes place at several levels. These levels differ in the
type of trader involved as well in the type of network used to deliver the energy to the customer.
Typically, electricity is transported through the national high voltage network and through
regional networks at a lower voltage. The former is called the transmission grid, the latter are
known as distribution networks. Very large users receive their electricity straight from the
transmission network, which is operated by the Transmission System Operator (TSO). The
Dutch TSO, Tennet, is a state-owned company with no ties to any of the producers or traders.
Large and very large users buy their electricity from wholesalers or directly from producers,
whereas small users buy their energy from retailers. Wholesale and transmission are organized
on a national (sometimes international) level, whereas retail and distribution take place on a
regional level. A region’s location and borders follow from the historical development of utility
regions. The regional character of competition does not imply that retail is limited to regional
companies. Retailers may be active in more than one region and even engage in competition in
regions in other EU countries. Obviously some regions may be more attractive for retailers to
compete for than other regions (e.g. because of higher density), which may result in regional
differences in the number of retailers.
Small and large users pay different prices for their electricity because these prices consist of
different components. Large users receive their energy from wholesalers directly from the
transmission grid, implying they pay for the commodity, wholesale costs and margins and
transmission costs and margins. Small users buy their energy from retailers, adding distribution
costs and margins as well as retail costs and margins to the price.
2.4 Types of markets
In order to understand the pricing mechanisms in the electricity market, let us devote some
attention to how electricity is traded. The lion’s share of electricity is traded through bilateral
contracts between users and suppliers. This is sometimes also referred to as the over-the-counter
(OTC) market. Some general information, like traded volumes and average price levels, are
known, but the contents of bilateral contracts are not public information. Some of those
contracts have ﬁxed prices, others may be linked to the spot market price, either real-time or
based on averages over time. As noted above, small end users are supplied by retailers, often on
bilateral contracts with standardised terms and a ﬁxed per unit price.
4Some 15 percent of electricity is traded or resold on the spot market. On this market,
organized in The Netherlands by the Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX), buyers and sellers of
electricity bid their offers 24 hours ahead of delivery. Prices are set on an hourly basis. After the
spot market has closed, trade volumes for the following day are known. Traders, formally load
serving entities, report their total trade volumes, consisting of bilateral contracts and spot market
trade, to the TSO. Each load serving entity is responsible for serving as much load into the
network as it takes from the network. If the load serving entity does not succeed, this causes
imbalance.
If imbalance occurs, the necessary condition that supply meets demand real time is not met
and the TSO has to act to keep the system from breaking down. To this end, the TSO calls in
more productive capacity from producers, which was bid into the single buyer market in
advance. The TSO orders the bids from low to high priced ones and deploys the units in this
order if necessary. If a unit of capacity is used to retain balance, the owner of the unit is paid the
imbalance price, which is paid for by the load serving entity causing the imbalance. Unlike the
spot market price, the unbalance price is a real-time price.
2.5 The integrated European electricity market
Europe has a long history of government-owned utilities, exercising their local or national
monopolies against a background of country-speciﬁc regulatory regimes. With the further
economic integration of Europe’s economies in the European Union, this was a situation that
could no longer be sustained.
Aiming for liberalization and integration of Europe’s electricity market, the European
Parliament and Council Directive for electricity (96/92/EC Electricity Directive) was adopted. A
free and integrated European electricity market is thought to increase efﬁciency of allocation of
resources, thus increasing welfare. The increase of competition in the electricity markets should
lead to convergence of prices among EU member states, preferably below their current levels.
Following the integration of Europe’s former national electricity markets, electricity ﬁrms
started integrating as well. The largest European utilities (EDF, E.ON, RWE, Enel, Vattenfall,
Endesa and Electrabel) started a wave of mergers and acquisitions both in the EU member states
and in the (then) candidate countries. The increase in concentration, resulting from these
mergers and acquisitions, probably leads the integrated European electricity market away from
the goals of liberalization.
So far, the European Union and its member states have not induced policy measures to
counteract the increase in concentration. Possible policy measures include blocking mergers or
5even splitting up large companies, as was done in the UK in the 1990s.
Concentration will not be a problem by itself if entry is entirely free. In that case, excess
proﬁts would induce entry, thus decreasing the level of concentration. In reality however, entry is
not entirely free. Formally, all barriers to entry are lifted, as the electricity directive states that
‘... new entry must be permitted under the transparent, objective and non-discriminatory terms
of an authorization procedure.’
Some barriers to entry have remained however. Favourable locations for generating plants
are scarce and often already owned by the incumbents. Furthermore, some of the knowledge
used in the process of generating electricity is very speciﬁc and therefore hard to come by for
entrants. Both barriers are relatively unimportant however and are not likely to deter entry to a
great extent.
A more important barrier to entry consists of imperfections in the capital market, in
combination with the large asset base of incumbents. This combination yields credible grounds
for predatory behaviour and limit pricing by incumbents. Furthermore, it may hinder entrants
from starting their operations at the desired scale, leaving them more vulnerable to market
volatility.
Besides the barriers to entry mentioned above, several market failures apply. An important
source of market failure in energy markets is the existence of externalities; costs or beneﬁts that
are ignored by markets in the determination of prices. Imperfect information is also an important
form of market failure, especially when it comes to observing real-time prices. Furthermore,
some problems related to natural monopoly may be imported from the downstream market, since
all producers are connected to a single network.
The existence of market failure may give rise to government intervention. One should keep
in mind however that the counterpart of market failure, regulatory failure, may lower the beneﬁts
of government intervention or even turn them into a net cost. Regulatory failure may result from
governments having insufﬁcient information regarding the market, diverging objectives between
government and private ﬁrms and non-welfare-maximising objectives of the government (Helm
et al. (1988)).
2.6 Security of supply
Supply security is currently one of the main issues in electricity markets, mainly because of a
number of crises and near crises in the ﬁrst years of this century, the California crisis being the
most notable one. Recent outages in the US, Canada, England, Denmark, Greece and Italy have
further emphasized both the importance for modern day society and the vulnerability of power
6systems.
One of the goals for the move to a liberalized market was to increase efﬁciency in electricity
production, which was partly to be reached through a decrease of (mostly-idle) generation
capacity. If the newly liberalized electricity market succeeds in matching demand and supply
efﬁciently, the decrease in spare generation capacity is the correct response to market signals.
These signals may consist of high peak load prices, serving as an instrument for efﬁcient
rationing as well as a mechanism for ﬁnancing investments in capacity. Price spikes are however
relatively new to electricity markets, coming from a state of regulated public monopolies with
heavy overcapacity, and they may scare politicians, tempting them to adopt protective policies.
These policies will however run the risk of being counterproductive with respect to security of
supply, as the California crisis has shown.
From an economist’s point of view, security of supply problems come from congestion
externalities. The key problem is that the demand for electricity is time-varying, whereas supply
is limited in the short run by capacity constraints. The combination of time-varying demand and
ﬁxed short run supply is shared by many services, obvious examples being transport and medical
services.
To take transport as an example, supply is limited by the existence of roads, whereas demand
varies over the day, often leading to congestion during rush hours. Congestion is an externality,
as adding one unit of demand above a certain threshold level has a negative impact on the quality
of the good for all users. Marginal customer are not charged for all the costs they incur. A
similar line of reason holds for electricity; an increase in demand beyond available capacity
levels increases the probability of a black-out, thus imposing costs on all users.
Externalities may be counteracted either by pricing or by granting (tradable) ownership
rights. If all externalities are internal to the market at stake (i.e. users impose costs on each other,
as is often the case with congestion), optimal taxation will often take the form of peak load
pricing. The spot market and the unbalance pricing mechanism provide a form of peak-load
pricing in the electricity market. Many consumers however do not observe real-time prices and
hence cannot react to them.
Two other issues are related to security of supply. First, uncertainty in the electricity market
slows down investments. Uncertainty originates from unclear prospects regarding European and
national competition and environmental policies. Although uncertainty hampers investments,
this is not really a security of supply problem. An increase in uncertainty will increase the risk
premium in capital costs and hence increases prices. Although the equilibrium outcomes change,
security of supply will not be affected. The second issue to be discussed here concerns business
7or investment cycles. These cycles occur if investment reacts slowly to demand developments.
Growing demand at ﬁxed capacity causes prices to rise, inducing investments. The resulting
increase in capacity causes prices to decrease, which in turn slows down investment. Investment
cycles are a common feature in industries with high ﬁxed costs and are no real threat to security
of supply, provided that the price mechanism works well. If producers are well-informed on
demand developments, they can anticipate and cycles are less likely to occur.
The increasing concern for security of supply has led governments throughout the world to
investigate or implement policy measures. One of the simpler measures is to subsidize capacity.
Systems like this, labelled capacity payments, are in place in Spain and several Latin American
countries.1 Subsidies apply to all available capacity, rather than spare capacity alone. Since
capacity now needs a lower load factor to be proﬁtable, construction of capacity for
supra-normal peaks may become economically viable as well. According to Ford (1999),
capacity payments prevent business cycles in capacity investments and long run prices will not
rise. It should be noted however that his result is based on a theoretical model, assuming perfect
competition. Oren (2000) shows that capacity payments are an inefﬁcient way of promoting
supply adequacy, and more efﬁcient alternatives are almost always available.
One of these alternatives is known as capacity markets, with its well-known application in
Pennsylvania-Jersey-Maryland (PJM). The system, named Interconnection Installed Capacity
(ICAP) requirement, consists of a requirement to back peak demand plus a prescribed level of
spare capacity with contracted capacity, allowing for bilateral trade of units of capacity at a
secondary market. Trade on this market generates revenues for production capacity, even if it is
not dispatched. The market mechanism makes sure that spare capacity is offered by those
producers that can offer it in the most efﬁcient way. The market mechanism also makes sure that
spare capacity in excess of the requirement does not receive any payments.
Hobs et al. (2001) conclude that under the assumption of a competitive market, the
PJM-ICAP system is likely to induce sufﬁcient capacity investment, without increasing the long
run cost of power. Stoft (2000, p.8) notes that the assumption of a competitive market does not
hold and that the capacity market ‘... has provided yet another arena for the exercise of market
power.’ Furthermore, capacity markets could likely import price spikes from neighbouring
regions without an ICAP-system in place.
A system similar to capacity markets is that of reserve contracts, the main difference being
that auctions rather than the secondary market are used to guarantee efﬁcient market outcomes.
1 See Oren (2000). A similar system was recently abolished in England and Wales.
8The Transmission System Operator (TSO) buys production units from producers, extracting
these reserves from use for generating electricity for the regular market and dispatching them in
case of an emergency. The costs of keeping spare capacity are charged to consumers using the
system fee.
2.7 Modelling electricity market characteristics
It would obviously be impracticable to incorporate all of the issues and characteristics of the
electricity market into our model. The model is limited to the production sector, thus ignoring
retail and sales to end-users. Likewise, we also ignore so-called autoproducers, electricity users
producing (a part of) their own electricity, mostly by combined heat and power generation.
The non-storability of electricity is modelled explicitly in the model by letting capacity limit
output, whereas the time-of-use pattern is incorporated in the model through the data. In terms
of market segments, the spot market plays a central role in our analysis, as this is the place where
hour-to-hour trade is conducted. Nevertheless, price and elasticity data used refer to the entire
market rather than the spot market alone. Competition on the EU-level is also modelled here,
especially its limitations through cross border transport capacity restrictions.
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3.1 Introduction
This section discusses how we modelled the market structure in electricity markets. We set out
by explaining why the Cournot model is not appropriate for modelling competition in the
electricity market. Section 3.3 discusses alternative ways to model market structure and conduct.
We ﬁnish this chapter by presenting the values for the conduct parameters applied in our model.
3.2 Why the Cournot model does not ﬁt the electricity market
A widely used model for a market with few suppliers (oligopoly) is the Cournot model2. In this
model each ﬁrm thinks it can raise the price above marginal costs by decreasing its supply
without the other ﬁrms taking advantage of this price raise by increasing their supply.
The other extreme is the Bertrand model of oligopoly, where each ﬁrm thinks there is no
point in trying to raise the price above marginal costs because surely the other ﬁrms will take
advantage of this price raise by increasing their supply (and thereby undoing the price raise).
This model gives the same result as perfect competition.








where ε is the price elasticity of demand (with ε < 0) and N is the number of ﬁrms. With
−εN < 1 the marginal revenue becomes negative and the Cournot model breaks down3.








It follows that prices are higher with fewer ﬁrms and with less elastic demand.
Coincidentally in the Dutch electricity market the right-hand-side of (3.2) is approximately
1/(1−1/0.25×4)) = 1/(1−1) = ¥, with four large ﬁrms and an elasticity ε of approximately
−0.25 4. Hence the Cournot model is useless during the hours when the connection between The
2 The previous version of Elmar used the Cournot model. See Lijesen and Mannaerts (2002).
3 This is easily seen in the monopoly case with N = 1. Let the demand be inelastic: (−ε) < 1. Then one percent increase
in price is obtained with less than one percent reduction of supply, giving a net increase in the monopolist’s revenues. This
cannot be an equilibrium: why not reduce supply, and have both less costs and more revenues?
4 See Koopmans et al. (1999), table 3.3. See section 5.4 for the breakdown of the elasticity between large users and
small users, as used in the actual computations.
10Netherlands and its neighbours is congested and the Dutch ﬁrms have no foreign competition.
More in general, observed moderate p/λ ratios cast doubt on the Cournot model in electricity
supply; see the extensive discussion in Stoft (2002) starting at p.347.
3.3 Conjectural variations and supply functions
The theory of conjectural variations assumes that each ﬁrm anticipates (conjectures) a reaction
(variation) by its rival(s) and was originally developed by Bowley (1924). Consider a simple
duopoly model with ﬁrms maximizing proﬁts. The proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 is deﬁned as:
π1 = q1p(q1+q2)−c(q1) (3.3)
with p(q1+q2) being the inverse demand function and c(.) denoting the cost function. Deﬁning












−λ(q1) = 0 (3.4)
In equation (3.4), dq2/dq1 represents the conjecture of ﬁrm 1 about the reaction of ﬁrm 2. This




(1+v)−λ(q1) = 0 (3.5)
Conduct parameter v covers the entire range between competitive and collusive behaviour, with
v = −1 representing Bertrand competition, v = 0 representing Cournot behaviour and v = 1
depicting collusion (which is equivalent to monopoly).
The main criticism against models using conjectural variations is that they are based on
inconsistent beliefs if used in a multiperiod setting. In a multiperiod conjectural variations
model, the outcome in one period may differ from the outcome in the other period, even though
the same conditions apply. This implies that the equilibria in both periods are not consistent.
A way around this is to deﬁne the model in such a way that only consistent conjectural
variations are allowed (see Perry (1982)).
A more elegant alternative to model reactions of rivals is through the use of supply functions.
In this approach, a ﬁrm’s strategy does not exist of a single point. Rather, it is represented by a
supply function5 qi = Si(p). These functions are then used to construct the non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium, or the supply function equilibrium (SFE).
5 Equation 3.5 may also be viewed as a supply function. The difference here is that in the supply functions approach v is
not deﬁned as a reaction function, but by the requirement of a Nash supply function equilibrium: no ﬁrm could have had
more proﬁt if it had chosen another value of v, given the v values of the other ﬁrms.
11Klemperer and Meyer (1989) introduce uncertainty as a motivation for supply functions.
They state that in a world of uncertainty ﬁrms may not want to commit to either price (Bertrand)
or quantity (Cournot) competition. Instead, ﬁrms would rather set a supply function to adapt to
changing conditions. A supply function implies a decision on a set of price and quantity pairs,
based on the demand function and competitors’ supply functions.
Green and Newberry (1992) note that supply function equilibria (SFE) are appropriate for
describing electricity spot markets. Prices are determined on a day-ahead basis, with suppliers
submitting bids existing of a schedule of prices for separate supply units. This is very much
comparable to a supply function, where suppliers determine a set of price-quantity pairs. The
main problem with SFE is the multiplicity of possible equilibria. An inﬁnite number of supply
functions may be constructed, rendering this approach impracticable for numerical simulations. 6
To get around this problem, we return to the use of conjectural variations, despite their
theoretical drawbacks. We try to retain consistency with results from studies based on SFE, as
well as with results from empirical studies regarding market types. Similar approaches are used
in empirical studies regarding the degree of oligopoly power (e.g. Appelbaum (1982); Iwata
(1974); Bresnahan (1987)).
3.4 Values for conduct parameters
Klemperer and Meyer (1989) show that supply functions equilibria (SFE) lie between Cournot
(steep supply function) and Bertrand (ﬂat supply function) outcomes. They ﬁnd that several
factors inﬂuence the slope of the supply function. If the number of ﬁrms is small, the SFE will
be close to the Cournot outcome, whereas a larger number of ﬁrms implies a ﬂatter supply
function. In a market with differentiated products, the supply function will be steeper, while
Bertrand-like outcomes are to be expected if goods are homogeneous.
Several authors (Vives, 1999; Bresnahan, 1981) stress the effect of the slope of the cost
function on reaction functions. Steep cost curves are associated with Cournot-type behaviour,
whereas a ﬂat cost curve is conducive to Bertrand-like behaviour. Klemperer and Meyer (1989)
slightly adjust this by stating that a marginal cost curve that is steep relative to the inverse
demand curve leads to a stronger tendency towards Cournot-type behaviour. From the
observations above, we may formulate conditions under which Bertrand- or Cournot-type
markets are more likely. We summarize these conditions in the table below.
Electricity markets typically form a mix of these conditions. The number of ﬁrms is
6 Likewise, the use of a multi-stage game solution would not be useful for numerical simulations.
12Table 3.1 Conditions for the likeliness of Bertrand or Cournot type of markets
Cournot more likely Bertrand more likely
number of ﬁrms small large
degree of product homogeneity low high
uncertainty of demand reactions at high price levels at low price levels
slope of marginal cost relative to inverse demand steep ﬂat
generally low and the product is (almost) perfectly homogeneous. The demand function is
relatively steep compared to marginal costs, but less so in peak periods, where the marginal cost
curve starts climbing because more expensive units come into use. Further note that capacity
decisions are based on long run incremental costs, which have a ﬂatter slope than short run
marginal costs. This implies that capacity is more likely to be determined in a Bertrand way,
whereas the output market is probably more Cournot oriented. This combination may lead to
prices well in excess of marginal costs, but only slightly above incremental costs, which may
resemble limit pricing if viewed from a distance.
Based on the above, we introduced a parameter which allows us to make a numerical choice
somewhere in between the Cournot model and the Bertrand model. The crucial quantity
1/(−εN) is multiplied with a factor between zero and one, giving a continuous scale from
Bertrand to Cournot, respectively. Note that this parameter coincides with 1+v in the
conjectural variations theory. Values for this factor are g= 0.2 (for the output decision of ﬁrms
in equation (4.7)) and G = 0.1 (for the investment decision of ﬁrms in equation (4.13))
respectively. These values imply a fairly, but not totally competitive market and are based on
outcomes in tables 3.4 and 3.5 of Scheepers et al. (2003), with prices and marginal costs for
Germany and The Netherlands, respectively.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the present version of Elmar, the CPB model of the electricity market7.
Section 4.2 describes the demand side of the model. Section 4.3 describes the various
techniques of producing electricity and the related marginal costs. Equating the latter to the
marginal revenue gives the production level which is optimal for the ﬁrm, given the production
capacity. Finally, sections 4.5 and 4.6 describe the ﬁrm’s optimal production capacity. This also
deﬁnes optimal investment.
Elmar is a comparative static model: any change in an exogenous variable has its effect in the
same year or the next year, since no gradual adaptation to shocks is modelled and any change in
an exogenous variable is foreseen by the ﬁrms which build production capacity. The model is
driven by the growth of demand over time. Elmar is also a model in which the electricity market
always clears, due to the response of demand and supply on the wholesale market.
In the rest of this section the notation is presented. Let qhikl denote the quantity of output
produced at hour h by ﬁrm i in region k which is supplied to region l. We ignore the possibility
that a ﬁrm in one region may be owned by a ﬁrm in another region. All ﬁrms in any particular
region are assumed to be identical. Hence the subscript i is not used to indicate a speciﬁc ﬁrm
but to distinguish between the output of one ﬁrm and the output aggregated over ﬁrms. See the
table below.
Table 4.1 The subscripts in the model
symbol description number of values
in the present model version
h hour of the day 24
i ﬁrm 4
k region of production 2
l region of consumption 2
Note that there is no index for the day of the year. All days are taken together. Hence the 24
hours h together are one year. The number of ﬁrms is given for The Netherlands.
7 The model was applied and brieﬂy described in De Joode et al. (2004, Appendix 7) and in Lijesen (2004, chapter 4).
Here we present more detail and more explanation. We also try to further improve the notation, and some mistakes in the
description are corrected. The same work is also reported in Lijesen and ten Cate (2004). The model is also applied in
Lijesen and Vollaard (2004).






is the output which is sold in region l at hour h by all ﬁrms i in all regions k. Prices have one or
two subscripts: the region l and possibly the hour h.
Finally, as we shall see below, next to the lower case letter q denoting the size of the output
there is the upper case letter Q denoting the size of the production capacity. This distinction
between output and capacity reﬂected in the case of the letter also holds for other variables
introduced below.
4.2 Demand




The quantity qhl is sold on the wholesale market at a single price phl. The large users have a





This price clears the wholesale market in that region at that hour. Hence we model the entire
wholesale market as a single spot market.
The small users pay a retail price to retailers who buy the required quantity on the wholesale
market. The retail price is equal to the average wholesale market price of last year, plus a retail
margin and tax. Hence the small users’ demand is independent of the current wholesale price10.







l is the retail price in region l and qS
l is the annual consumption of the small users in
region l. The latter is distributed over the 24 hours h using an exogenous hourly consumption
8 In this way a particular value such as q12 has no meaning, since it is unclear which subscripts are omitted. However, in
this paper only symbolic subscripts are used.
9 Note that in the present version no substitution between hours is assumed, as in professional cooling and freezing
where electricity consumption can sometimes be put off a few hours, until the price has decreased.
10 This creates a time lag of one year in the reaction of small users to price changes. This may create short hog cycles.
However, we did not observe these; possibly because of the ever growing demand.
15pattern. Note that the small users pay one price independent of the time of use; hence we assume
that there is no time of use pricing schedule.
The coefﬁcients bL
hl and bS
l vary inversely with the assumed demand growth over the years11.
The latter is somewhat larger than the growth of the national income. Also these coefﬁcients vary
over the hours h inversely with the observed hourly time path of the volume of electricity use12.
No forward contracting is modelled here. Also, the autoproducers (agricultural and industrial
ﬁrms which produce their own electricity) are not modelled. This is left for further work.
4.3 The production techniques mix and the marginal costs
The model distinguishes between ﬁve techniques for the generation of electricity: gas-ﬁred,
coal-ﬁred, nuclear, large scale hydro, and other renewables.
There is a theoretically optimal combination of these techniques. This combination gives
each technique a percentage share in the MW production capacity, such that total cost are
minimized.
However, before we explain this theory, it must be noted that in practice the techniques mix
depends on much more than costs alone. Coal-ﬁred generation is regulated because of its
negative environmental impact. Nuclear power generation has been controversial for decades.
Hence in the model the techniques mix is given at the start of any time path and for simplicity all
new capacity is assumed to be gas-ﬁred, by far the most important technique in The Netherlands.
See also Ford (1999). See chapter 5 below for statistics.
The theory of the least-cost combination is nevertheless presented here because it is related
to the discussion of marginal costs below. The theory may also be interesting from a historical
point of view, as an important part of the traditional electricity economics, combining the typical
characteristics of electricity production: (practically) non-storable, ﬂuctuating over time, and
capital intensive.
The theoretical least-cost combination of the generation techniques is based on the fact that
the techniques differ in building costs per kW capacity, and also in variable costs per kWh13. For
simplicity we assume for a moment that variable costs are fuel costs only and that only two
11 We have modelled the demand growth over time simply as a growth of the customer base. Note that the demand of
two identical consumers taken together has the same a coefﬁcient as one consumer, but only one half of the b coefﬁcient:
if q = (a− p)/b then 2q = 2(a− p)/b = (a− p)/(b/2). See also section 5.5 below.
12 Of course these ex post observed volumes underestimate the unknown ex ante variation in the demand functions by
hour: the ex post variations are dampened by the price variations which they create.
13 In the previous version of Elmar, described in Lijesen and Mannaerts (2002), the techniques mix was modelled
differently, with two quadratic total cost functions for each technique.
16techniques exist: gas-ﬁred and coal-ﬁred.
Using coal is cheaper per kWh than using natural gas. Hence in the least-cost situation all
available coal-ﬁred capacity is used all the time14. Only at peak hours, when more capacity is
required than the coal plants can deliver, gas-ﬁred plants are used. Building a gas-ﬁred plant is
cheaper per kW than a coal-ﬁred plant. The optimum share of coal-ﬁred production capacity in
the total production capacity depends on the length and height of the peaks, and on the various
costs15.
Marginal costs
In the model, short run marginal costs (SRMC) are determined by the technique mix, as
follows. Firms will always use the production technique with the lowest variable costs, given the
production capacity of the various techniques. If the capacity of this technique is insufﬁcient at
some particular hour, then they also use the production technique with the next-to-lowest
variable costs, etcetera. The last technique used in this way is the marginal technique: its
variable costs is the short run marginal costs of production. This creates a staircase shape of the
marginal costs16. The techniques are said to be used in their merit order.
In order to increase the robustness (and realism) of the staircase model, we smooth this shape
as follows: a piece-wise linear curve is drawn through the midpoints of the vertical sections of
the staircase. At the top of the staircase we need one more vertical section; we give it the same
height as the previous one. See graph 4.1 below, for The Netherlands17. In the next sections
14 Note that in the least-cost combination, the technique with the lowest variable costs produces the entire so called base
load. In The Netherlands the four techniques with the lowest operation costs together are not enough to produce the base
load. This sufﬁces to show that this optimizing theory is not applicable.
15 This is usually demonstrated graphically; see Schweppe et al. (1988, pp.307–309), Stoft (2002, pp.35 and 45), and
Hunt (2002, pp.403–415). In a formula: the coal-ﬁred capacity is such that only during a fraction t of the time more
capacity is required than the coal plants can deliver, where t is deﬁned by the break-even equation Ccoal +tλcoal =
Cgas +tλgas, or t = (Ccoal −Cgas)/(λgas −λcoal). The C are the annuitized building cost per kW per year and the λ are the
variable costs per kWyear instead of per kWh. If not 0 <t < 1 then one technique is the overall cheapest and the other
technique is never used.
16 This staircase model has already been used in the electricity industry for a long time. See the diagram at OEEC (1958,
p.40). An alternative model assumes ﬂexible capacity instead of rigid capacity: all techniques are used all the time, up to
the point where their marginal costs are the same. See for instance Grainger and Stevenson (1994, p.540). This has
approximately the same result as a “smoothed” staircase model.
17 This graph is without hydro production, being so insigniﬁcant in The Netherlands that it would be hardly visible. The
graph differs somewhat from the similar graph at page 28 in Scheepers et al. (2003). The latter depicts individual
generators, with a level below 3 eurocent/kWh at the start of the “gas segment” which increases more or less gradually to
over 4 eurocent/kWh.
17these marginal costs are indicated as λhik: the marginal costs at hour h for ﬁrm i in region k18.




















4.4 Short run optimal output
The short run proﬁt of ﬁrm i in region k at hour h is as follows, omitting everything which is






Here the function cP(qhik,Qik) indicates the short run costs19 of producing qhik while the
production capacity equals Qik. The function cT(qhikl) indicates the costs of transporting qhikl
from region k to region l. Note that lower case letters π, c, q and g denote short run output
related variables, while upper case letters P, C (both introduced below), Q and G denote
capacity related variables.
18 Of course λhik is a function of production volume qhik. This function depends on the region k, since fuel costs differ
between regions. Hence the proper way to denote this would be λk(qhik), which we mercifully abbreviate to λhik. In the
nutshell model in section 4.5 below the symbol λh is used, as there are no regions k and no ﬁrms i there.
19 Note that the letter c does not indicate per unit costs here, unlike in De Joode et al. (2004, Appendix 7) and in Lijesen
(2004, chapter 4). This simpliﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions considerably.
18For the moment we ignore the possibility that production capacity is a binding restriction on
the output; this will be discussed at the end of this section. The ﬁrst-order conditions for a
























Here λhik indicates the short run marginal production costs at hour h of ﬁrm i in region k, as
described in section 4.3 above. The variable τhkl is the tariff of transporting power at hour h from
region k to region l. This tariff is computed in an equation, such that it equals the ﬁxed tariff (the
so called “postage stamp” tariff) or the tariff which brings demand for transmission at hour h
down to the available transmission capacity, whichever is highest. The latter may be the result of
an auction. (We ignore here the difference between the marginal tariff and the actual tariff.)
The expression ∂ phl/∂qhikl in the left-hand-side of equation (4.6) indicates how much the
wholesale market price is inﬂuenced by one ﬁrm. Following section 3.3 above, we introduce a













Equation (4.7) is substituted into equation (4.6), giving:
phl −gbL
hlqhikl = λhik +å
l6=k
τhkl (4.8)
Equations (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4), and (4.8) together determine the 4HL+HKL variables qhl,
qL
hl, qS
hl, phl, and qhikl. The upper case letters indicate the number of values of the respective
lower case subscripts, with K = L of course.
With g= 0 substituted into equation (4.8) we get the competitive result:
phl = λhik +å
l6=k
τhkl (4.9)
with price equal to marginal costs (including transport costs). Now assume for a moment that
equation (4.9) holds: output is optimal with perfect competition. Next we introduce oligopoly,
20 See appendix A for a discussion of how the use of ﬁrst-order conditions saves us from the problem of Borenstein et al.
(2000).
19with the g term in equation (4.8). Then marginal revenues are lower than marginal costs, and the
ﬁrm will reduce output until a new optimum for the ﬁrm is reached. Thus the result of imperfect
competition is a lower level of production – which is of course the natural result of oligopoly.
Note that production capacity Qik puts a restriction on output qhik. Technically this can be
viewed as the marginal costs λhik going up vertically21 at qhik = Qik. Then the supply curve also
goes up vertically at that point. During the hours when this capacity restriction is binding, the
price rises to the level where the demand curve intersects this vertical segment of the supply
curve. As we shall see in the next section, this plays an important role in the determination of
investments in production capacity.
Contrary to fact, the model produces most cross-border trade between the Netherlands and its
neighbours at night. This can be explained as follows. In The Netherlands gas-ﬁred production
is the marginal technique all the time in the model. During a few hours at night, nuclear power
generation is the marginal technique outside The Netherlands and its marginal cost is much
lower than the marginal cost of gas in The Netherlands. During the rest of the time, coal-ﬁred
generation is the marginal technique outside the Netherlands, and its marginal cost is not much
lower than the marginal cost of gas in The Netherlands. Hence in the model gas-ﬁred is never
used outside the Netherlands. Though it is an interesting prediction that such a day/night
inversion will take place in a fully integrated European electricity market, at present it
diminishes the realism of our model.
Furthermore, we found that an increase in the demand for electricity in Western Europe (WE)
can lower the price of electricity in the Netherlands (NL), while one might expect that a demand
increase anywhere in the model will only produce upward price changes. This paradox can be
solved as follows: the local demand increase in the exporting region WE lowers the unbalance in
the cross-border transport. Hence the auction price for cross-border transport gets lower, and
hence also the marginal costs of the export of electricity from WE to NL. This lowers the price
of the electricity supplied from WE to NL, and hence lowers the price of electricity in NL.
4.5 Optimal investment in a nutshell
In the previous sections output and prices in the short run were discussed, given the production
capacity. Optimal investment in production capacity is discussed in this and following sections.
Investment in the model is deﬁned as net investment: zero investment implies constant
21 See Stoft (2002, pp.68/69) for a discussion of the logic of a marginal cost function with a segment which has an inﬁnite
slope. Imagine that the vertical curve in ﬁgure 4.2 below is in fact not vertical, but extremely steep – the difference not
being visible. Then the derivative exists everywhere (except exactly at the kink in the curve).







a From Boiteux (1960, p.171) and Boiteux (1964, p.77)
production capacity.
For the moment we consider optimal investments for a social welfare maximum, which
coincides with perfect competition. Assuming perfect foresight, this optimum requires the
following ﬁrst-order condition, in the form of long run marginal revenues (LRMR) being equal
to long run marginal costs (LRMC):
the price per kWh which is required to keep demand down to capacity, minus marginal
running costs per kWh, cumulated over the hours during which capacity is a binding
restriction (LRMR), equals the incremental annuitized cost of building an extra kW
(LRMC).







The symbolC(Q) denotes the annuitized cost22 of building the production capacity Q. This
includes costs paid over several decades, up to the present. The derivative dC(Q)/dQ is equal to
the annuitized current building costs per kW.
The expression {qh = Q} in (4.10) above denotes the set of hours when production capacity
is a binding restriction. All marginal costs λh are equal during these hours, since all qh are equal
22 As in footnote 19: note that C does not indicate per unit costs, unlike in De Joode et al. (2004, Appendix 7) and in
Lijesen (2004, chapter 4).
21during these hours. Also we have ph > λh during these hours: this ph is the price which is
required to bring demand at hour h down to capacity. With perfect competition we have ph = λh
outside these hours. It will be shown below that this result is the special case of the theory
applied in our model, when perfect competition is assumed; see equation (4.16) below.
This result shows the dilemma of reserve capacity: investment in production capacity is only
proﬁtable if there is not too much of it, since its marginal proﬁt comes from the hours when there
is scarcity of production capacity.
A historical note
Optimal investment in electricity production (or in the capital-intensive production of
anything non-storable with ﬂuctuating demand) has been already studied in the ﬁrst half of the
previous century. See the French paper Boiteux (1949) and its translations Boiteux (1960) and
Boiteux (1964). On page 171 of Boiteux (1960) and page 77 of Boiteux (1964) it is assumed that
there are two demand levels: day (high) and night (low), each of them during one half of the
time. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 4.2. Our equation (4.10) then becomes: (p−λ)/2 = dC/dQ,
where p is the price during the day. (The division by 2 is required to express both sides of the
equation in the same unit.) The optimal capacity is the value of the daytime demand function
given this price p = λ +2dC/dQ.
The verbal formulation of the ﬁrst-order condition immediately above our equation (4.10)
was adapted from Turvey (1968, pp.91-93). The equation (4.10) itself is the same as equation
(10.2.9) in Schweppe et al. (1988, p.242), with the coefﬁcient of the “Quality of Supply” γQS set
to zero.
For the treatment of this subject in the recent literature, see Stoft (2002, pp.126–129) and
Hunt (2002, p.410) and the papers described in chapter 1 above.
A numerical example
Equation (4.10) can be illustrated as follows, using the computer model with parameters
adapted according to the assumption of perfect competition. We show that with only a few key
ﬁgures one can compute whether there is (in theory) to much or to little capacity. In section 4.6
below this will be repeated with imperfect competition.
Building costs for gas-ﬁred plants are approximately 900 euro/kW. Let the relevant interest
rate be 10% per year. Then marginal investments costs dC/dQ are 90 euro/kW per year.
22Let the SRMC during peak hours (when capacity is a binding restriction) be λh = 3.3
eurocent/kWh. (This is at the kink in the solid line in ﬁgure 4.2 above.) Let these peak hours be
10 hours per day. Let during this time ph −λh be equal on average to 75% of λh. Then the
marginal revenues of investment are 0.75 × 0.033 euro/kWh × 10 hours/day × 365 days/year =
90 euro/kW per year, which is the same as the marginal costs. Hence the production capacity is
optimal.
Note that it becomes proﬁtable to invest further if prices increase, variable costs decrease,
building costs decrease or the interest rate decreases. In section 4.6 this example is reﬁned with
imperfect competition.
4.6 Investment with imperfect competition
In this section equilibrium investment is derived for a system of connected regional markets,
with imperfect competition. Recall from section 4.3 above that no optimal combination of
production techniques is modelled: any investment is in gas-ﬁred production capacity23.














The ﬁrst-order conditions for a maximum proﬁt are found by differentiating (4.11) with respect
to Qik and equating the result to zero. Note that during the hours h when the production capacity
is binding in production region k, we have qhik = Qik and the proﬁt depends on Qik not only

























23 Note that this assumption is a formidable reduction of the complication of the model. Without this assumption, even a
demand increase in the middle of the night, at an hour at which the capacity is deﬁnitely not a binding restriction, has an
effect on investment: it changes the optimal technology mix, requiring an investment in a base load technique and an
equal desinvestment in a peaker technique. The increase in capital costs is exactly offset by the decrease in variable
costs. See Turvey (1968, pp.46-47).
24 Compare with the total differential: df(x,y) = (∂ f/∂x)dx +(∂ f/∂y)dy. Hence df/dx = ∂ f/∂x +(∂ f/∂y)(dy/dx).









































The G is the conjectural variations parameter for capacity, similar to g in equation (4.7) above.
The approximation (≈) is motivated by the fact that the marginal proﬁt from local supply and
from exports cannot be much different, due to the arbitrage possibilities in the model. (There
might be a difference at times when the connection between the regions is congested.)
We substitute equation (4.13) into equation (4.12) and proceed on the assumption that the




























The approximation in the second line of equation (4.14) implies ignoring the term with
∂cP/∂Qik. This term reﬂects the older generators being pushed down the merit order, due to the
inclusion of the efﬁcient new generator. The SRMC decreases at hours when an old generator is
no longer needed25.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for a maximum of (4.14) are found by equating the result to zero.








25 In De Joode et al. (2004, Appendix 7) and in Lijesen (2004, chapter 4) this effect is called “variable cost savings”. In the
present computer model we have ignored this effect. Of course the marginal costs λhik themselves are always computed
using the correct Qik, as described in section 4.3.







and we are back at the nutshell case of section 4.5 above 26 27.
Assume for a moment that equation (4.16) holds: capacity is optimal with perfect
competition. Now introduce oligopoly, with the term with G in equation (4.15). Then the
optimal capacity is smaller than the actual capacity: marginal revenues are less then marginal
costs. Hence the result of imperfect competition is less production capacity – as with production
itself, discussed below equation (4.9).
Finally it might be interesting to note here that as a spin-off from the work on the computer
model, the sensitivity of the long run marginal proﬁt dPik/dQik for deviations from the
equilibrium capacity is deﬁned and computed; see section B.4. In The Netherlands this
sensitivity is small because the large markets around us absorb the effect of non-optimal capacity.
Numerical example of investment with imperfect competition
Equation (4.15) can be illustrated as follows, using the computer model.
Coincidentally in the computer model the contribution of the oligopoly term (the term with
the G) to equation (4.15) is approximately equal to the capital costs in the right-hand-side for
The Netherlands. Hence in this case the price peak åh phk −λhik is twice as large as in the
numerical example in section 4.5. The peak lasts 14 hours per day with ph ≈ 2λh on average.
Hence it lasts 14/10 times as long and it is 1/0.75 times as high as the peak in section 4.5, which
is indeed together about twice as large.
To illuminate this result further, note that in our model oligopolist ﬁrms with zero investment
costs would invest only just as much as with perfect competition (the social optimum) and
normal capital costs.
The price peak described above is very large. Hence in the model the equilibrium capacity is
much smaller than the actual production capacity in the ﬁrst years of this century in The
26 Unfortunately in De Joode et al. (2004, Appendix 7) and in Lijesen (2004, chapter 4) the λ term was omitted from the
ﬁrst-order condition for optimal investment, while at the same time the “variable cost savings” term was included, although
the latter was not included in the computer model.
27 Compare with Scheepers et al. (2003, p.31), who deﬁne the long run marginal costs as dC/dQ+åλh and compare
this with åph (our notation). Hours are operation hours here; not hours when capacity is binding. There is no oligopoly
term here.
25Netherlands. It takes time to reach the equilibrium capacity, as the growth of demand gradually
pushes prices upwards. If ex ante demand is about 28% larger than in 2000, prices are high
enough to make equation (4.15) hold true, with the large price peak described above.
Before that point in time is reached, the production capacity is not decreased in the model:
we assume that investment cannot be negative.
265 Data and calibration
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter the data used in the model are described: sources, important numerical values,
and the method of calibration for some coefﬁcients.
Presently the model contains two regions: The Netherlands on the one hand, and “Other
Western Europe” on the other: Germany, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Switserland. The
model can also switch to only our neighbours Germany and Belgium in the “Other Western
Europe” region.
Note that all data values can be found on our website www.cpb.nl.
5.2 Cost data
While using this model, we have used slight variations of the variable cost data, depending
among other things on the available data at the time. Typical cost ﬁgures for The Netherlands for
operation plus maintenance and for fuel (gas-ﬁred, coal-ﬁred, and nuclear) are given in OECD
(1998). For the region “Other Western Europe” the costs of gas-ﬁred production are slightly
higher than in The Netherlands. Variable costs of renewable and hydro power are not relevant for
the computation of the marginal costs, since these techniques are never the marginal technique in
the model28.
Capital costs are required only for gas-ﬁred production; see section 4.3 above. They are
expressed in euro/kW per year, or eurocent/kWh29. We have used various values, from the 1.2
eurocent/kWh at p.173 in De Joode et al. (2004)30 to 1 eurocent/kWh. See also the numerical
examples in sections 4.5 and 4.6 above.
All costs —except those for hydro— are assumed to decrease with one half percent per year,
due to technical progress.
5.3 Production capacity data
We used the production capacity data shown in the table below. The rows of this table are
ordered in decreasing merit order: the top rows are used ﬁrst and the bottom row is used last.
28 More precisely: these techniques and the next technique in the merit order. See the description of our construction of
short run marginal costs in section 4.3 above, with a sloping line segment for each technique.
29 As an aid in the comparison, note that for instance 1 eurocent/kWh equals 1×365×24/100 = 88 euro/kW per year.
This coincides with building costs of 880 euro/kW times an interest rate of 10% per year.
30 This value is somewhat high for the present purpose, since it gives costs per kWh produced.
27Obviously in The Netherlands the gas-ﬁred technique is always used, as we noted already in
section 4.3 above. These data are computed from the ﬁrst line in the tables 19 (“Projections of
electricity generating capacity by fuel”) in OECD (2003). We deﬁned “Renewables” as the sum
of “Combined Renew. & Waste” and “Geothermal Solar Wind”.
We did not use the tables 18 (“Net maximum electricity generating capacity”) in OECD
(2003) because with those tables it is difﬁcult (and error prone) to assign production capacity to
fuel type, due to multi-ﬁred generation.
Table 5.1 Production capacity, 2000 (GW)
Netherlands Other Western Europe Germany and Belgium fraction available
Hydro 0 50 10 0.30
Renewables 1 10 8 0.80
Nuclear 0 94 28 0.85
Coal-ﬁred 3 63 51 0.75
Gas-ﬁred 16 51 36 0.75
The GW ﬁgures in the table include unavailable generators due to maintenance, repair,
etcetera, as indicated by the “fraction available” in the table. This fraction is merely an educated
guess. Note that this fraction is not the average utilization rate, which is endogenous in the
model.
5.4 Calibrating the demand coefﬁcients
We did not estimate any equation in the model with regression analysis, mainly because there are
no timeseries available of commercial electricity markets in the countries included in the model.
However, we did calibrate the demand coefﬁcients of the output model of sections 4.2
through 4.4, using the data of the year 2000. We swapped these coefﬁcients with an equal
number of observed (or computed) endogenous variables: the coefﬁcients are temporarily made
endogenous and the endogenous variables are temporarily made exogenous. Solving the model
in this way gives values for the coefﬁcients. If we then return back to normal simulation (i.e. we
undo these temporary changes) and use these values of the coefﬁcients, the endogenous variables
automatically get their correct value.
The calibrated coefﬁcients were for each of the two regions l: the 2H demand coefﬁcients for
the large users (aL
hl and bL
hl in equation (4.3) above), and the 2 demand coefﬁcients for the small
users (aS
l and bS
l in equation (4.4) above). The number of hours H = 24.
These coefﬁcients were calibrated simultaneously against: for each of the two regions H +1
28assumed demand elasticities (see below), and H large users’ demand volumes, and 1 small users’
yearly demand volume. Hence 2H +2 calibrated coefﬁcients against the same number of
observations. Note that the ex ante demand pattern obtained in this way ﬂuctuates more than the
ex post demand pattern, because prices increase with increasing demand.
Price elasticities are taken from the CPB energy demand model NEMO, described in
Koopmans et al. (1999). A value of −0.14 for large users is taken from table 3.3. A value of
−0.35 for small users is taken from the row “Households” in table D.2, by adding the bold-face
values of Replacement and Good-housekeeping.
For each region, the observed yearly consumption in the calibration year was distributed over
the H = 24 periods of the day using the observed daily load pattern. It was assumed that the
large users together use a ﬁxed GW amount equal to a large fraction of the lowest load (which
occurs near 5 o’clock in the morning) plus a variable GW amount equal to a small fraction of the
load above the lowest load.
The rest of the load observed in the calibration year is consumed by the small users, whose
consumption pattern over the day is computed using the exogenous pattern.
5.5 Interpretation and value of calibrated demand coefﬁcients
Before presenting some results of the calibration, recall that the inverse demand functions in the
model are of the following form (see section 4.2 above):
p = a−bq (5.1)
The coefﬁcient a can be interpreted as the price which reduces demand to zero, although of
course the model is not built for such extreme situations. Alternatively this coefﬁcient can be








Hence coefﬁcient a must be larger than the price p. For the model version with two regions, all
calibrated a coefﬁcients were roughly in the range of 35 to 55 eurocent/kWh in 2000, which is
indeed much larger than observed prices. The value of a for large users is highest at peak times,
since it is proportional with p.
The demand coefﬁcients b vary inversely with the size of the market; see note 11 at page 16.
However, the product bq is size independent:




29Its calibrated values are in the range of approximately 30 to 50 eurocent/kWh, with the same
pattern over the day as the value of a, of course.
306 A numerical example
6.1 Introduction
This chapter shows some numerical outcomes of the model, focusing on the value of the conduct
parameters. As these parameters play a central role in the model, numerical examples are
suitable for illustrative examples as well as sensitivity analysis. The next section assesses the
sensitivity of the model to the short term conjectural variations term. The other sections in this
chapter illustrate how changes in conjectural variations affect model outcomes.
6.2 Model sensitivity to short term conjectural variation parameters
In chapter 5 we showed how demand parameters are calibrated. The calibration of these
parameters involves an assumed value for the short term conjectural variations term g. This
raises the question how sensitive model outcomes are to this assumed value. This section
assesses the impact of variations in g at a constant demand elasticity. This implies that we vary
the value of g throughout the process of calibration and simulation.
We judge the sensitivity of the model by the average price. We average the price over several
years to make the result insensitive to ﬂuctuations in any particular year. Although the model
contains no business cycles, short cycles may occur due to the small users reacting to previous
year’s price. Also short cycles may occur due to the solution method, discussed in Appendix B.
These cycles are short relative to the chosen time period, i.e. 2005-2020. Table 6.1 presents the
results of the sensitivity analysis.
Table 6.1 Sensitivity of average prices, 2005-2020 for calibration with different values of g and G (index,
0.1/0.1=100)
g
G 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0 77 89 134 469 na
0.1 88 100 139 469 na
0.2 98 111 150 470 na
0.3 108 129 163 474 na
0.4 117 141 182 513 na
It is clear from these results that the inﬂuence of parameter g on the outcomes is huge. For
larger values of g, prices even become inﬁnite, as was to be expected from our discussion in
31chapter 3 31. The sensitivity to parameter g may be worrisome, it also suggests that the chosen
parameter is not too far from its actual value. If it would have been, we would not be able to get
plausible results for the price-cost margin, as we do now.
6.3 Competition in short run output
Besides the sensitivity analysis performed above, we can also vary the short term conjectural
variations term g without recalibrating the model. This implies that we assume the value used for
calibration to be correct, while investigating the effect of a change in the parameter after
calibration. In other words, rather than assessing the impact of variations in g at a constant
demand elasticity as we did in the previous section, we now assess the impact of variations in g
with a constant demand curve.
The numerical outcomes in this section are based on demand parameters calibrated at g=0.1,
with all simulations run at a constant long term conjectural variations term of G=0.1. We present
three different types of outcomes; the price at noon, the price at 4 AM and the number of hours
at which capacity is binding. The ﬁrst indicator represents peak prices, whereas the second
stands for off-peak prices. The number of hours at which capacity is binding is an indication of
how tight capacity restrictions are.
Table 6.2 Average prices and hours of binding capacity, 2005-2020 for different values of g (index, g=0.1=100)
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Price at noon 100 113 135 159 181
Price at 4 AM 100 131 159 185 208
Hours of binding capacity 100 56 25 14 10
An increase in g impacts both peak and off peak prices in approximately the same
magnitude. Note that off-peak prices rise faster than peak-prices, so that the pattern by time of
day becomes ﬂatter. Both prices increase fairly strongly, pushing up price-cost margins. Because
of the increased price-cost margins, it becomes more interesting to invest in capacity, so
producers do not have to suppress proﬁtable demand. Therefore, the number of hours at which
capacity is binding decreases.
31 The model collapses as prices reach inﬁnity, urging us to report ’na’ rather than inﬁnity in the table.
326.4 Competition in capacity
As in the previous section, this section establishes numerical outcomes of variations in the
conjectural variations term. This time, the long run term G is varied, while the short term
conjectural variations term g is kept at the value of 0.1.
Table 6.3 Average prices and hours of binding capacity, 2005-2020 for different values of G (index, G=0.1=100)
0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Price at noon 100 129 151 168 177
Price at 4 AM 100 100 101 101 102
Hours of binding capacity 100 141 157 165 174
Table 6.3 illustrates that the impact decreased competition in capacity runs through scarcity.
Peak prices and the number of hours at which capacity is binding increase, whereas off-peak
prices are hardly affected. This mechanism is even clearer if we look at the timing of
investments in new capacity. Assuming demand to grow by 4
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The ﬁgure clearly shows that at lower levels of competition, investments will be postponed
33so that scarcity increases gradually under the inﬂuence of growing demand. There seems to be
no apparent difference in slopes once the curves start climbing.
6.5 Outcomes for combinations of conjectural variations
In this section, we combine the approach from the two previous sections. We vary both the long
run and the short run the conjectural variations terms and look at the effect on prices. Table 6.4
lists the outcomes for the average price.
Table 6.4 Average prices, 2005-2020 for different values of g and G (index, 0.1/0.1=100)
g
G 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
0.1 100 124 155 184 210
0.3 129 138 158 184 210
0.5 152 159 170 188 211
0.7 172 176 185 197 214
0.9 182 188 197 207 220
The most interesting ﬁnding in table 6.4 is that the inﬂuence of G is small for large values of
g and vice versa. This implies that the highest of both dominates the outcome, which is quite
consistent with theoretical ﬁndings (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983; Davidson and Deneckere,
1986). In general, the inﬂuence of g is larger than that of G, which makes sense, as the inﬂuence
of G is only felt on output for which capacity is binding. Since we have established that g is
likely to be larger than G (see chapter 3), the inﬂuence of G is even smaller.
34Appendix A Local and global proﬁt maximization
Proﬁt is maximized in our model by equating marginal revenues to marginal costs. Hence we
might escape a problem discussed in Borenstein et al. (2000), as follows.
They discuss at length the case of two identical markets; each with one producer and one
consumer. Producers optimize their output, being Cournot players. Below a certain threshold
value of the capacity of the line between the two markets, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium.
Above this threshold value the Cournot outcome of a single two-producers market is a unique
pure-strategy equilibrium.
However, for each non-zero line capacity the single-market Cournot outcome is a local proﬁt
maximum for each ﬁrm, given the other ﬁrm’s output. The ﬁrms in our model are satisﬁed with
any local proﬁt maximum, since they merely solve the ﬁrst-order conditions, as noted above.
Hence the single-market Cournot outcome is a solution of our model, although more proﬁt may
be gained by withholding supply until the connection between the two markets is congested (into
the market), and then withholding supply further while reaping monopoly proﬁts.
We discovered this with a small computer model of the numerical example in Borenstein
et al. (2000, pp. 305/306) with a line capacity for which there is no pure-strategy equilibrium for
ﬁrms which maximize their proﬁts globally. With ﬁrms equating their marginal revenues to
marginal costs, this test model produced the single-market Cournot outcome. Indeed a graph of
proﬁt as function of supply (with the other ﬁrm at the Cournot outcome) shows a double-peaked
curve, with the global proﬁt maximum at the left of the Cournot maximum. Computer programs
can be obtained from the authors or are available on www.cpb.nl.
35Appendix B The computer model
B.1 Introduction
In this section some details about the computer model are discussed. Knowledge of these details
is not needed to understand the economics of the model. (However, in section B.4 below an
economic concept is introduced: the sensitivity of the marginal proﬁt for deviations from the
optimal production capacity.) The actual computer model ﬁles will be available on our website
www.cpb.nl.
The present version of the model contains two regions and 24 time periods within a year. As
discussed following our equation (4.8) above, this amounts to 4HL+HKL = 4×24×2 +
24×2×2 = 288 equations. In the computer model the short run market also contains equations
for marginal costs λhik, transmission tariffs τhkl, small users’ price pS
l , etc. Together with the
equations for the optimal investment the model has more than 2000 equations.
On the website we have also put some information about the names of the variables, about
the software, etc. Those texts need no further discussion here. However, in order to prevent
confusion we note one point here: for historical reasons the hour index is denoted as i in the
computer ﬁles, while in this paper the index i is used for the individual ﬁrms and the hour index
is h. Since all ﬁrms in any particular region are assumed to be equal, no ﬁrm index is required in
the computer ﬁles.
B.2 Restrictions on variables
The short run model contains two restrictions which may or may not be binding, depending on
the rest of the model: output is restricted by production capacity, and trade between regions is
restricted by transmission capacity. This makes it hard to solve the model, as our software is
based on Newton’s method, with repeated linearization using numerical derivatives. Numerical
derivatives are computed as the ratio of two small perturbations. A change in regime —a
restriction becomes binding, or not binding— makes the computed derivatives useless.
Hence the restriction of the production capacity, discussed at the end of section 4.4, was
implemented as follows. The prices phl in equation (4.8) are in fact only provisional. If at hour h
the capacity is binding in production region k then the actual price in that region is computed
from equation (4.3) for region l = k with the quantity qL
hk replaced by åiQik −qS
hk.
The maximum transmission capacity is exogenous in the model. This maximum restriction
was implemented using the Fisher-Burmeister function; see Fischer (1992).
36B.3 Separation of production and investment
Solving the model simultaneously for optimal investment and optimal production is a problem.
A positive perturbation in a Qik (to compute a derivative during the Newton iteration process)
creates a change in regime for all qhik which are equal to Qik. Moreover a negative perturbation
of Qik invalidates the value of these qhik.
Instead, we use last year’s marginal proﬁt of investment dPik/dQik from equation (4.14) as
an indication whether or not investment will increase proﬁt, as follows. Only when this
expression was positive in the previous year, will there be investment in the current year. This
breaks the simultaneity between production and investment. The amount of investment —if
any— is somewhat more than the production capacity in the previous year times the percentage
growth rate of demand. Over a period of several years this gives roughly the correct investment
on average, with overshooting and undershooting in the individual years. For ﬁnal results, we
run the model with a monthly frequency rather than an annual frequency, in order to mimic the
within-year simultaneity between investment and production.
We found that it is not always enough to invest the above mentioned quantity – namely,
somewhat more than production capacity in the previous period times the percentage growth rate
of demand. “Not enough” meaning here that the marginal proﬁt may be positive and increasing
for several adjacent time periods, instead of alternatively positive and negative. This can be
explained by the interaction of the two regions: with growing demand in both regions and with
differing SRMC curves, there might be a region which must invest not only to satisfy growing
local demand but also growing exports.
B.4 The proﬁt sensitivity coefﬁcient σ
The above method of using the marginal proﬁt of investment as an indication whether or not
investment is needed, can be improved. Rather than using only the sign of the marginal proﬁt, as
in the previous section, one might also use its size, as follows. As we shall see, this did indeed
solve the problem described in the last paragraph of the previous section32.




It is assumed that all short run equations are solved given any particular value of production
capacity Q. In order to simplify the discussion, all subscripts have been omitted here.
32 This method was not yet used in De Joode et al. (2004) and Lijesen (2004), or in Lijesen and Vollaard (2004).
37Let Q∗ be the solution of equation (B.1), which is the value of Q for which proﬁt P is at its
maximum. If equation (B.1) does not hold and hence Q is not equal to its optimum Q∗ then in
the next time period Q is increased through investment. Deﬁne the optimal investment DQ as:
DQ ≡ Q∗−Q (B.2)
Following Newton’s method, we assume that the derivative dP/dQ is linear in a sufﬁciently












where σ is a positive constant, discussed below. The approximation is motivated by the fact that
Q will not differ from Q∗ by more than the effect of the demand growth in one year (or month).
Only when the approximated DQ from (B.3) is positive in the previous period, will there be
investment in the current period. The quantity of investment —if any— is the approximated DQ
of the previous period, plus the demand growth rate times the Q of the previous period. This
breaks the simultaneity between production and investment, as in the previous section. Equation
(B.3) and equation (B.5) below can easily be veriﬁed with elementary mathematics33.
The σ coefﬁcient is size independent in the following sense. When two identical markets are
taken together as one market then both proﬁt P and capacity Q double in size, while σ has the
dimension of P/Q and does not change.












The model is solved in a special way, as follows. Demand is kept at the initial level (instead of
gradually increasing) and there is no cost-saving technical progress. The capacity Q is gradually
decreased exogenously, such that the marginal proﬁt dP/dQ —computed from equation
(4.14)— becomes positive after some “time periods”. In fact in this way the model is solved
repeatedly for the initial time period with different values of the production capacity. The scatter
33 Let the proﬁt near its maximum be a hill-shaped parabola: P = aQ2 +bQ+c, with a < 0 and b > 0. (These
coefﬁcients a, b, and c are used here only for this footnote. They are unrelated to the same symbols elsewhere in the
paper.) The derivative of P is dP/dQ = 2aQ+b and hence dP/dQ = 0 at the value of Q equal to Q∗ = −b/2a.
Equation (B.3) can be written as σ ≡ Q∗(dP/dQ)/DQ = Q∗(dP/dQ)/(Q∗ −Q) = (−b/2a)(2aQ+b)/((−b/2a)−Q)
= −b(2aQ+b)/((−b−2aQ) = b, which is constant. This veriﬁes equation (B.3). At Q = 0 we have
dP/dQ = 2aQ+b = b = σ, which veriﬁes equation (B.5).
38diagram of dP/dQ versus Q shows a linear relationship near the point at which dP/dQ is zero.
The constant term of this linear relationship equals the value σ for the initial time period of the
model.
Note that the σ coefﬁcient, which was invented here for the purpose of numerically solving
the model, is also an interesting characteristic of the market: using the ﬁrst line of equation (B.4)
it can be described as the sensitivity of the marginal proﬁt for deviations from the optimum
production capacity. The dimension of σ is the same as the dimension of the marginal proﬁt, and
hence the same as the dimension of the marginal costs of investment. Its unit therefore is either
euro/kW per year or eurocent/kWh; see note 29 on page 27.










Hence the σ coefﬁcient can also be interpreted as the proﬁt of investment in production capacity
if there were no production capacity at all35.
Values for σ were computed as described above, based on the second line of equation (B.4).
This was done for both regions in the model, and also both with and without trading. The
resulting values of σ are ranging from 22 to 26 eurocent/kWh, with the exception of The
Netherlands when trade is allowed: in this case σ = 8 eurocent/kWh. This is caused by the fact
that a relatively large neighbouring market absorbs the effect of non-optimal local capacity: the
price drop (or rise) caused by too much (too little) production capacity increases the export to
(import from) the large neighbour. This effect is small if the neighbour is relatively small. Hence
it works only for the smallest of two neighbouring markets if they differ very much in size.
With the values of 8 and 24 eurocent/kWh for the two regions respectively, the model can be
solved easily, without the problem mentioned in the last paragraph of the previous section.
34 Note that P cannot be quadratic for large Q. In the scatter diagram of dP/dQ versus Q the value of dP/dQ becomes
a negative constant for Q much larger than Q∗. This constant is equal to minus the investment costs per unit of Q:
dC/dQ. The reason is that with much excess capacity the long run marginal revenue term in equation (4.14) becomes
zero since in that case the capacity is never a binding restriction: there are no hours h for which qhik = Qik.
35 Compare with the interpretation of the a coefﬁcient in the demand function in section 5.5: the price which reduces
demand to zero. The model is not built for zero demand or for zero production capacity. However, such interpretations
serve to make clear what the dimension of the coefﬁcients is and may help to appreciate their magnitude.
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